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REVIEWED By TODD D. VOLKER*

There is a dark room and a sick man. There is a deathbed and
there are relatives, called together, from far away. Not much more is
needed. Tolstoy's description here is brief but full.
Everyone knew that he must inevitably die soon, that he was
half dead already. Everyone wished for nothing but that he
should die as soon as possible, and every one, concealing this,
gave him medicines, tried to find remedies and doctors, and
deceived him and themselves and each other. All this was
falsehood, disgusting, irreverent deceit. 1
Deceit and emotion aside, one truth that can be ascertained
without question but with fresh sting, is that medical technology has
considerably changed our relationship to the dying. At the same time,
dying is made less simple every year because we sense an egalitarian
commitment and entitlement to costly and complex forms of health
care. Elaborate medical technologies, developed without delay or
hesitation at countless research labs, all work to maintain the mechanical processes of life ever longer.
This is wonderful enough, to adjust medicine and technique,
drugs and therapy, into an accord with the basic functionings of the
human body. And "wonderful" is hardly enough word to describe
this concord. To maintain and nourish the human body, to regulate
and control the harmonies of metabolism, is surely something like a
cloud-scraped miracle.
The benefits of new medical technologies are obvious; they allow
physicians time enough to work on larger, more disastrous and
systemic problems. The benefits are so immediately seen that no
argument with sufficient force has appeared to dislodge their place in
our lives. Arguments against new medical technologies often seem
Luddite-inspired, and contrary to our appreciative attitude toward all
* B.A. 1985, Knox College; Mr. Volker is currently completing an A.M. in
Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Urbana, specializing in moral, political and
legal philosophy.
1. L. TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 56-57 (1946).
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science. Any effort at controlling the direction of research founders
because of public hesitancy at dealing with ethical questions.
A series of court cases has developed because of the successes of
life-sustaining medical techniques, although no clear pattern of doctrine has developed that appears to completely answer our moral
concerns. Courts dealing with these new techniques have pointed out
that these procedures often have a great difficulty that only later
becomes apparent. Where most difficult medical cases, medical hard
cases, have relied upon these techniques as intermediaries and allies
in a broader program of treatment, some cases have appeared in
which these life-sustaining treatments have become ends-in-themselves.
Rather than deny death to a curable patient, they sustain life in those
without hope.
Larry I. Palmer, Vice President for Academic Programs and
Professor of Law at Cornell University, has written a recent book
which promises answers while looking through troublesome issues in
law and medicine. In his Law, Medicine, and Social Justice, Professor
Palmer teases out a broad new way of understanding these legally
and medically complex controversies, through careful sorting of case
law and medical practices. His book is an effort to conceptualize an
"institutional approach" to solving medical hard cases; this is actually
an effort to change the legal locus of responsibility in such medical
hard cases. Professor Palmer believes that our general sentiments
toward individual choice and responsibility, a laudable and cornerstone belief of liberalism, have foundered in these exceptional medical
cases. A more socially-inclusive approach, one which is guided toward
a reconciliation of the perspective of various participants, is one which
Palmer favors-an institutional approach may allow for a coherent
resolution of the sundry problems created by medical technologies. I
believe Palmer's inclination is generally correct; it offers more than
we have at present in a rights-based approach for dealing with morally
difficult medical issues.
The purpose of this Review is to highlight the philosophical
motivations of Palmer's institutional approach in Law, Medicine, and
Social Justice. This is especially relevant because the work so clearly
shows the conceptual shortfall of a rights-based approach to law.
Palmer's institutional approach is without question an attempt to step
away from a rights-oriented legal approach toward a more sociallyinclusive approach to the legal and ethical problems caused by new
medical technology. The institutional approach is an effort to find a
morally distinctive basis for judgment in these tough cases, and it
should hardly surprise lawyers that matters of philosophy are involved.
Even in the Illinois Supreme Court's recent decision of In Re Estate
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of Longeway, 2 justices invoked admittedly philosophical reasons in
dealing with substantive judicial questions.
Professor Palmer says many eminently reasonable things in Law,
Medicine, and Social Justice, and his book is worthwhile not only as
a discussion of a new approach to the relationship between law and
medicine, but it is valuable as well as an introduction to the present,
troubled relationship between these institutions. There is a need to
bring together a forceful, critical approach to the problems of modern
medicine along with illustrative court cases. Law, Medicine and Social
Justice is such a work.
Rather than provide a summary history of important court cases,
Palmer has wisely organized Law, Medicine, and Social Justice in a
way that gives his institutional approach a better voice. By dividing
his chapters into distinct aspects of medical issues, Professor Palmer
is able to sharpen the critical edge of his institutional approach to
demonstrate its effective worth across a range of troublesome lawand-medicine questions. Law, Medicine, and Social Justice carries the
investigative possibilities of the institutional approach into areas such
as medical malpractice and liability, medical specialization, medical
hospitals and organizations, pertinent and prominent court cases, and
into difficult legal matters such as the care of children and terminally
and critically ill patients. In the main, the institutional approach is
gradually elucidated in this exercise. Of value is Palmer's criticism of
present legal-medical cases, and his earnest call for sophisticated legal
reform.'
There are plenty of hospital task forces, think tanks, and academics who have argued that difficult, medical hard cases must be
made on a social basis, and not upon an often difficult and sometime
impossible solitary basis. This idea has long had wide currency, yet it
is worth a good deal more than a worn Confederate dollar. We
frequently understand this argument to mean that anxious and profound decisions to pull the plug, to suspend life-sustaining treatment,
should probably be made by the patient's family, his physicians and
perhaps the officials of the hospital in which the patient is treated.
However, the success of Palmer's institutional approach is that it is
intended to reach beyond group decision making in individual cases.
Law, Medicine, and Social Justice presents a socially inclusive approach which hopes to change legal doctrine and legislation as well.
But even more is intended by the institutional approach to
handling difficult legal and medical cases and issues. The approach
2. In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989).
3. L. PALMER, LAW, MEDICINE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 125-37 (1989).
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in Law, Medicine, and Social Justice is largely premised upon theoretical considerations; Palmer's approach relies upon considerations
of social relationships and even of social philosophy. The institutional
approach has a pervasive effect upon the philosophic structure of the
law. It is important to note here exactly what he means:
The institutional approach builds upon some of the more
profound scholarly critiques of law and medicine, which argue
that the current reliance upon 'informed consent' as the moral
and ethical basis of legal decision-making in the medical arena
is misplaced. There are two reasons underlying these criticisms.
First, granting to an individual the power to be a sole decisionmaker in such situations as a severe physical or mental illness
has destructive social and psychological consequences. When
law delegates exclusive decision-making power to patients,
their decisions lead to their psychological isolation. The perception of exclusive decision-making power is thus 'anti-communal,' because law is used to fracture the sense of social
connections to the person most in need of societal care. To
avoid these adverse consequences, law must acknowledge its
own uncertainty when it intervenes in medical decisions and
must therefore leave ultimate decision-making authority un4
certain.
These are the beginnings of an argument with significant ramifications for legislation and law. Palmer's communitarian argument is
quite persuasive, made especially so by the moral troubles caused by
biomedical research and technology. Not only do we have a vague
definition of death, but incomplete understandings of what exactly
constitutes good health and appropriate medical care. Uncertainties
also arise from the very explosive quality of medical research; there
is an ill-defined border between what may be considered a medical
practice and what counts as a medical experiment. In essence, the
medical techniques that we read of in newspapers or hear about from
television have been so accomplished as to alter our moral perceptions,
challenging our moral universe by subtly altering our moral conceptions. The locus of moral authority, and of moral responsibility, has
been affected. This Palmer recognizes. The problem remains in law,
however, that all legal discussion of medical hard cases has been
stumbling in providing answers because it has been hobbled by the
doctrine of informed consent. This, Professor Palmer believes, has a
4. Id. at 10.
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substantive effect on proper medical hard case decision-making.
A second problem is that the informed consent approach does
not address the fact that physicians traditionally rely on silence
rather than dialogue in their contacts with patients. Many
physicians do not share their doubts with patients in the face
of the inherent uncertainty of modern medical intervention,
because such sharing is seen as contrary to the physician's
[The
basic image of what it means to be a professional ....
about
assumptions
masks
consent
informed
current reliance on
professionalism, expertise, patient knowledge, and patient capacity to understand, assumptions that need to be examined
critically before being incorporated into legal doctrine.'
This caveat gives Palmer breathing room to explore the ways law
has grappled with problems posed by extreme advances of medical
technology. By setting aside the doctrine of informed consent, Palmer
can begin to seriously analyze these matters.
Palmer's institutional approach leads to a view of health as a
"relational or social concept" rather than a pure and single objective
state. As he notes, this institutional approach is more apt than an
approach based on individual rights and informed consent, because
broad social goals and rare social goods, as well as questions of
have always been considered within the province
individual liberties,
6
of the courts.
Given the vehicle of the institutional approach, we can travel
quite a length in considering the relationship between law and medicine. More is involved in the relationship than a patient's rights,
although we enjoy arguing over them. It makes little sense to posit
an equal and undeniable right to the very best medical treatment
without recognizing that medical resources are not only expensive,
but are often enough in short supply and long demand. It makes little
sense to talk of what needs rights fulfill, when one is irrecoverably
comatose.
Legal means of dealing with question raising medical cases have
traditionally meant liability rules and malpractice suits. These have
often been straitjackets in handling such cases. Professor Palmer
adroitly questions the value of liability rules in these instances, and
he decides that they too strongly follow the path suggested by a
rights-based approach and the doctrine of informed consent. More5. Id.
6. Id. at 34.
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over, they generally have a bad effect upon the practice of medicine
because they inhibit physicians from suggesting difficult, risky procedures, and finally serve to demand an "objective" determination
of one's medical possibilities and potential outcomes. 7 Liability rules
hinder mutual trust, squashing the free flow of dialogue between
patient and physician.
The institutional approach is made more credible by this criticism.
Palmer convincingly demonstrates that its strength is subtle, its effect
enormous, for the institutional approach he offers in Law, Medicine,
and Social Justice better follows the social context of human decision
making. I tend to believe, with Palmer, that one's most difficult
questions are most wisely solved through consultation with other
people involved in the same, or in a similar, project. Consultation is
of real importance in indeterminate situations such as medical hard
cases, where few roadmaps exist and few landmarks guide our path.
The institutional approach radically reforms our notions about the
doctor-patient relationship, and finally affirms a more significant role
for the patient than that of silent and passive consenter or consumer
of medical services. Palmer's wisdom is to look to the social context
when considering tough decisions in difficult medical questions; this
perspective is increasingly relevant, given that medical science threatens to become wildly amoral.
Dominating recent inquiry into the relationship of law and medicine has been discussion over treating the terminally ill patient. No
other aspect is so sensational. No other element quite so vividly
displays the differences between vocal adherents of a "right to die"
and those equally voluable advocates of a "right to life." The
paradigm case, pointed to as often as the full moon in August, is In
re Quinlan.'
7. Id. at 26. Many commentators have observed that liberalism requires

"objective" knowledge. A forceful argument can be made that there
is objective
knowledge-an argument with a great deal of implication for public policy. The
question is a haunting one. It can be demonstrated capably that just about everyone
knows what is meant when one says "coat" or "nose" or "toes." The same easy
consensus cannot be reached when words with a qualitative connotation, such
as
"strident" or "dignified," are used. In instances which are novel,
sudden and unique,
words and concepts become less apt. Medical hard cases are cases which defy ready
practices, and, for this reason, they seem to defy ready rules and terms. See
H.
PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981). "With the
rise of science has come

the realization that many questions cannot be settled by the methods of the exact
sciences, ideological and ethical questions being the most obvious examples." Id. at
150. Some interesting constitutional implications of this can be found in M. PERRY,
(1988).
8. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).

MORALITY, POLrrIcs, AND LAW
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Palmer discusses the implications of Quinlan, using the critical
powers of his institutional approach, as well as the cases of Brother
9
Fox, John Storar, and Claire Conroy. Each of these cases has caused
a stir among political commentators. In different ways, each underscores the failure of a rights-based legal approach in providing complete answers to medical hard cases. Each of these cases points to one
grand fact. Much more is involved in the practice of medicine than
manipulating a body to preserve the biological essentials of living. I
believe Palmer is correct when he suggests:
[D]eath, as part of the much larger concept of health, must
be viewed primarily as a social rather than biological state that
law simply confirms. By viewing death as social as well as
relational, we will begin to see that caring for critically ill
patients involves personal involvement-emotional, spiritual,
and psychological-rather than the objective distance implied
in our present use of the term 'health care."
The examples of Storar and Brother Fox both provide Palmer
with critical targets; both demonstrate the legal difficulties involved
with the popular "living will." Living wills are only infrequently
prepared, but frequently unspecific and unsound. The confusion that
has resulted stems from courts seeking to uphold "rational and
'
unequivocal decision-making in the face of impending death." , The
principle adversely affects those deeply involved with a critically or
terminally ill patient: at the very time when those most concerned
about an ill relative or friend feel the greatest urge to speak on his
behalf, their honest concerns are shut from the legal and medical
system. This radically affects the care that can be provided to patients.
For Professor Palmer, the real problem of living wills is "conceptual,
Social isolation is the final result of such a
rather than procedural."
2
pathway.'
legal
Law, Medicine, and Social Justice is the start of a larger argument
about the point and purpose of human life. While for centuries
religious injunction caused a profound reverence for life; while since
the Enlightenment, liberal, individualistic theories have strengthened
a "preserve life at all cost" perspective, it is much less clear whether
these values will continue to hold their effect. Ironically, this is a
9. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981); In
re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 457 A.2d 1232 (1983).
10. L. PALMER, LAW, MEDICINE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 73 (1989).

at 80.
11. Id.
at 90.
12. Id.
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result of our very success with medical technique and with saving life.
In a fine recent work on ethics, moral philosopher James D.
Wallace argues that a redefinition of death is necessitated by modern
medical technology: a "wedge" has been driven "between permanent
cessation of 'vital signs' and permanent loss of the capacity for doings
and experiences." 3 This fractures our idea of death. Wallace presents
an appealing contextualist reason for allowing the suspension of life
preserving methods to the irreversibly damaged and irrecoverably
comatose patients.
The form of life characteristic of human beings is a complicated form of social life. A survey of our kind reveals that
everywhere human life involves community, language, art,
morality, politics, and cumulative knowledge, among other
things. The capacities, physical and physiological, for living
this form of life are many. Human beings learn the ways of
their community, absorb whatever store of wisdom the community has, learn to adapt this store to their own particular
circumstances and projects, and attempt to conduct their lives
in accordance with all these things. A human being's participating in this form of life, the exercise of those capacities the
possession of which is living, consists of episodes of doing
and experiencing. One's life is a drama in which one is the
protagonist. When the doings and experiences which make the
drama end finally, one's life is over. 14
Such a contextualist perspective resonates in Law, Medicine, and
Social Justice. Without much self-examination in his book, it informs
Palmer's analysis of nursing homes and hospices, malpractice and the
legal care of children, medical specialization and medical hard cases.
Palmer's book goes for a long, impressive stride across the fields of
law and medicine, and it is to his credit that he manages to begin
exploring so many issues in these areas. The institutional approach
permits this analytical rapprochement.
It is fair to note that Palmer's Law, Medicine, and Social Justice
must be considered only the first few steps at presenting a contextualist
approach to these problems. Professor Palmer only develops the
outlines of a general theory. This, however, is a bit of meringue in
the face. A complete theory along these lines would have to include
significant work in political and moral philosophy. Yet what is
13. J. WALLACE, MoRAL RELEVANCE AND MORAL CONFLICT 145 (1988).
14. Id. at 140-41.

1989:149]

LAW, MEDICINE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

troublesome about Law, Medicine, and Social Justice, is that no
complete definition is ever finally provided for this institutional
approach. Palmer is calling for a radical reformulation of our understandings of life, death, care and health. This is necessary prior to a
larger change in our understanding of the justice of these matters.
But without a firm definition, the institutional approach seems to be
too much of a good thing, offering only positive returns. This
oversight is serious; James Wallace's above quote well illustrates its
significance.
Ironically, it is the need for a rethinking of our concepts of
health, life and care that points the reader toward a more profound
criticism of Palmer's institutional approach. Redefinition of these
concepts necessarily involves moral philosophy. The way we understand ourselves, our actions and our relations, the way we conceive
of others, is not only morally relevant but legally relevant as well.
There is a tight practical and conceptual connection between morality
and law. When Palmer argues in Law, Medicine, and Social Justice
that his institutional approach relies upon law itself to contain sufficient resources to radically reform itself, the task of general redefinition of these terms-life, care, health and justice-point instead to
ethics and ethical theory as the source of conceptual change. To a
great degree, it is a matter of philosophy, of moral ontology, and not
of law. Law cannot parthenogenically remake itself. 5
Palmer suggests otherwise. The way Palmer speaks of the "formal
institution of law" and of the "institution" of medicine highlights
this criticism. Too often Palmer writes as if law and medicine were
purely functional and formal institutions. He presents a positivist's
sociology; his work suggests a positivist's view of society as a formal,
rational, functional grouping of functional and mutually supportive
institutions. Such institutions may be fully manipulated and changed
under the auspices of law. According to Palmer:
Adopting an institutional perspective would change the role of
legal intervention in health care decisions dramatically. Judges,
lawyers, legislators, and administrative officials would first
seek to understand the social and organizational context of
15. The most popular discussion of this argument is found in Dworkins'
criticism of legal positivism throughout his collections of essays. See R. DWORKIN,
TAKNIG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). For more lucid discussions see J. FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); D. LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1984).

A study of the history of abolitionism is a fine way to begin doubting the easy idea

that law has sufficient internal resources for grand structural change.
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the controversy before making any decisions regarding medicine. As legal decision-makers came to understand the larger
social context, they would recognize that law's influence upon
medicine as practiced is necessarily limited, but law's influence
upon our conception of medicine's social role is potentially
very great. Rather than seeking to regulate the individual
doctor-patient relationship, law would aim to influence and
16
direct the institutional structure of modern medicine.
Although there are real problems in the sociology presented in
Law, Medicine, and Social Justice, I believe Professor Palmer makes
a convincing start in formulating a contextualist approach to law and
medicine. Philosophers, worried metaphysicians, and "intellectual"
politicians have endlessly considered the philosophical problems involved in reconciling a recalcitrant rights-philosophy to human reality.
Yet for all the talk and bustle, pages inked and voices raised, there
are rarely suggestions made which are both practical and illumined
with a sense of justice. This is the true worth of Palmer's book: it
should be considered a success simply for providing this roll-up-thesleeves sensibility.
No one reading Palmer's book will be struck by much original,
speculative philosophy and this should be considered a genuine weakness. Innovation is difficult to achieve. But these matters have been
thoroughly considered elsewhere, and one can bet tall money that
publishers next year will be offering more of the same old stew. Law,
Medicine, and Social Justice, however, is of worth because of Palmer's
open willingness to discuss the mechanisms of change, and to point
out the practical ways to bring about remedies that are sorely needed.

16. L. PALMER, LAW,

original).
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9 (1989) (emphasis in

